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3.1  Introduction 
Tax rules affect the ability of U.S. firms to compete in foreign markets with 
local and other foreign firms. The primary channel through which taxes exert 
this influence is by  changing the cost of  capital. The competitive ability of 
firms that face different costs of capital depends on how capital intensive they 
are and how sensitive the demand for their product is to the price. This paper 
does not attempt to look at specific products, but does estimate how tax rules 
alter the cost of  capital for U.S.  firms and competing firms in a variety of 
foreign markets. 
Past comparative studies of the cost of capital have been mostly concerned 
with domestic investment between countries. A typical finding of these studies 
is that, during the past decade, the cost-of-capital gap between countries has 
been largely attributable to differences in the domestic cost of funds, leaving 
relatively little room for the role of tax systems. 
In the case of multinational investment, however, an international compari- 
son of the cost of capital is complicated by the possibility of overlapping tax 
jurisdictions and the possibility of raising investment funds in different coun- 
tries and transferring those funds between the parent and the subsidiary. Thus, 
comparing the cost of capital for domestic investment between countries may 
lead to very misleading implications for the competitiveness of multinationals. 
This paper attempts to modify the conventional cost-of-capital measure in a 
way that incorporates the impact of international tax rules. The analysis com- 
pares measures of the cost of  capital for U.S. firms and their local competi- 
tors in major foreign markets, and those of U.S. firms and other foreign multi- 
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nationals in a given foreign market. The evidence presented in this paper 
suggests that, other things being equal, corporate tax rules related to foreign 
investment make U.S. firms operating in major foreign markets, on average, 
face about a 20 percent higher cost of capital than domestic firms in the United 
States when U.S. source equity capital is considered as the marginal source of 
investment funds. These U.S. firms may very likely face a higher cost of equity 
capital than local firms in foreign markets. U.S.  firms may also face a cost-of- 
capital disadvantage vis-h-vis firms from other countries in a given foreign 
market, partly due to the absence of  a dividend imputation scheme in the 
United States and partly due to relatively strict U.S. rules regarding the exemp- 
tion or deferral of home-country tax on foreign-source income and foreign tax 
credit utilization. 
3.2  The Cost of Capital for Foreign Investment 
The appendix to this volume describes the features of tax systems that apply 
to multinational corporations. This section sets out a framework within which 
the cost of capital for foreign investment is estimated. The focus is on the way 
in which corporate tax rules related to international investment influence the 
cost of capital. 
All shareholders are assumed to live and be taxed in the home country. The 
foreign subsidiary is wholly owned by the domestic parent, which maximizes 
shareholder wealth. While the subsidiary can finance its investment through a 
variety of  sources, this paper focuses on the case where the parent uses its 
retained earnings as the basic source of funds for both domestic and foreign 
investment in order to highlight the differential tax effects on domestic and 
foreign investment, given the same cost of funds. This paper also ignores per- 
sonal taxes and focuses on the role of corporate taxes in determining the cost 
of capital. 
The cost of capital is the pretax rate of  return that a corporation must earn 
in order to pay the rate of return required by the providers of capital. The cost 
of capital depends on the discount rate as well as several other considerations 
such as the tax treatment of capital income and the depreciation of the invest- 
ment asset. 
The discount rate for domestic investment is determined by the rate of return 
required by the shareholders, which is the risk-adjusted rate of return on alter- 
native investment opportunities. What is the appropriate discount rate for fi- 
nancing foreign investment? Taking the parent to be a conduit between foreign 
investment  and  the  shareholders, the  discount rate  for  foreign investment 
should reflect the taxes associated with repatriated dividends. Let u be the total 
tax rate on repatriated foreign-source dividends. The parent, whose objective 
is to maximize the wealth of its shareholders, then requires that foreign invest- 
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the required rate of return on foreign investment is larger than that for domestic 
investment by the factor of  1/(  1 -  u). 
The effective tax rate on foreign-source dividends (u)  consists of both host- 
country and home-country components, as described fully in Jun 1995. Sup- 
pose, for example, that domestic and foreign corporate tax rates and the with- 
holding tax  rate are 0.5, 0.4, and 0.05, respectively. Under  the exemption 
system, the discount rate for foreign investment will be 5 percent larger than 
that for domestic investment using the same source of funds. Under the credit 
system, however, the home country taxes at the rate of  17 cents per dollar of 
dividends paid by the subsidiary. This surtax translates into a 20 percent higher 
discount rate. 
In the remainder of the paper, various cost-of-capital measures for U.S. firms 
and their major competitors in foreign markets are presented. The methodol- 
ogy used to calculate the cost of capital is fully described in Jun 1995. A com- 
mon real interest rate of  5 percent and a common inflation rate of 4.5 percent 
were assumed for the purposes of focusing on how the tax codes affect the cost 
of capital and of maintaining comparability between countries. 
In summary, the cost-of-capital measures reported in the following sections 
are the pretax rates of return necessary to earn a given after-corporate-tax rate 
of return (real interest rate) of 5 percent. All the variations in the cost of capital 
for foreign investment across countries are purely due to differences in their 
corporate tax systems. The values for tax parameters are drawn from Organiza- 
tion for Economic Cooperation and Development 1991, and relate to the sys- 
tems in force as of  1 January 199  1. 
3.3  U.S. versus Local Firms in Foreign Markets 
Consider first the cost of capital for U.S. firms and their local competitors 
in major foreign markets in table 3.1. The first column reports the cost of capi- 
tal for domestic investment. The effects of  corporate tax rules on the cost of 
capital differentials for domestic investment between countries do not appear 
to be large, which is in line with most previous comparative studies. Across 
countries, the required pretax rates of return on domestic investment are higher 
in Japan, Germany, Italy, and Australia than in other countries, reflecting their 
relatively high corporate tax rates. 
Now consider the case of U.S. firms investing in foreign markets (column 
2). In the sample host countries, U.S. firms face about a 20 percent higher cost 
of equity capital on average than in the case of U.S. domestic investment (9.3 
percent versus 7.6 percent). A 20 percent higher cost of  capital for foreign 
investment might put U.S. multinationals in a disadvantageous  position in most 
foreign markets. Comparing the two columns indicates that U.S. firms face a 
higher cost of equity capital than their local counterparts in every sample coun- 
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Table 3.1  The Cost of Capital for U.S. and Local Firms in Foreign Markets 
Host Country  Local Firms  U.S. Firms 
United States domestic  1.6  1.6 
Japan  9.0  10.6 
Canada  8.1  9.5 
France  1.3  9.1 
Germany  9.5  8.3 
Netherlands  7.1  1.8 
United Kingdom  1.7  8.6 
Sweden  1.2  8.8 
Switzerland  6.6  8.2 
Australia  9.0  11.5 
Italy  9.1  9.9 
Average (foreign  8.0  9.3 
investment) 
When only corporate taxes are considered, for example, U.S. domestic firms 
face a slightly lower cost of capital (7.6 percent) than do Japanese domestic 
firms (9.0 percent) because of higher corporate tax rates in Japan. Because of 
the tax costs associated with international investment, U.S. multinational firms 
face a higher cost of equity capital than do local firms in Japan (10.6 percent 
versus 9.0 percent), according to the calculations that underlie the figures re- 
ported in table 3.1. It has been noted in the literature that Japanese firms have 
enjoyed a cost-of-capital advantage over U.S. firms due mainly to the differ- 
ence in the cost of  funds between the two countries during the past decade. 
Since the results reported in this study are based on the assumption that there 
are no cost-of-funds differentials between countries, the negative impact of 
international tax rules on the cost of capital can be interpreted as an additional 
source of disadvantage  for U.S.  firms operating in Japan when these firms draw 
transfers from their domestic parents. 
3.4  U.S. versus Other Multinationals in Foreign Markets 
In a foreign market, U.S. firms compete not only with local firms but also 
with multinationals from other countries. Table 3.2 shows the cost-of-capital 
measures for firms from different countries operating in Japan. 
In column 1, the cost of capital for U.S. firms is in the lower end of the 
spectrum (10.6 percent). Note that those firms whose cost of capital is higher 
than U.S. firms’ are from countries with a dividend credit scheme (Canada, 
France, Germany, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, Italy, and Australia). 
In these countries, the cost of two sources of parent equity funds-new  equity 
and retained earnings-may  be different. Since personal taxes (therefore, a 
personal tax advantage for capital gains relative to dividends) are ignored in 
this paper, the dividend imputation scheme will make the cost of parent new 25  Corporate Taxes and the Cost of Capital for U.S. Multinationals 
Table 3.2  The Cost of Capital for Firms Operating in Japan 
Equity Transfers with  Equity Transfers 
No Imputation Credits  with Imputation Credits 






































equity lower than that for parent retained earnings for financing domestic in- 
vestment. 
If  shareholders in  these  countries  are  allowed  to  take  such  dividend- 
imputation credits for  foreign-source dividends, multinationals from these 
countries can lower the cost of capital for foreign investment by using parent 
new equity instead of parent retained earnings as the source of transfers. In 
this  case,  as  shown  in  table  3.2,  firms  from  countries with  a  dividend- 
imputation scheme have a clear advantage over U.S. firms. For example, the 
average cokt  of  capital for firms from imputation countries is 5.4 percent, 
which is about half the cost of capital for U.S. firms. This result suggests the 
potential importance of integrating personal and corporate taxation in enhanc- 
ing U.S. competitiveness. 
Some  countries  try  to  restrict  investors’  ability  to  use  the  dividend- 
imputation scheme on dividends from domestic corporations financed by earn- 
ings from abroad. Typically, countries require that dividends eligible for the 
dividend-imputation scheme be less than the firm’s after-tax profits from do- 
mestic operations. Unless a firm desires an abnormally high dividend payout 
rate, however, this restriction is unlikely to be binding. 
There are several additional factors that may add to the competitive burden 
of U.S. firms operating abroad. Among major international investor countries, 
the United States has the tightest rules regarding the extent to which home- 
country taxes on foreign-source income are exempted or deferred and regard- 
ing the limitation of foreign tax credits. For example, the Tax Reform Act of 
1986 has made pooling of worldwide income more difficult for U.S. firms by 
confining the eligibility to earnings from majority-owned subsidiaries while 
many other countries tried to adopt the exemption method by  statutes or by 26  JoosungJun 
treaties; unlike its major competitors, the United States considers loans a sub- 
sidiary makes to its parent to be the equivalent of a dividend to which a U.S. 
surtax may be applied; a recent U.S. tax bill (H.R. 5270, the Foreign Income 
Tax Rationalization and Simplification Act of  1992) includes a provision that 
repeals tax deferral; the United States is the only major developed country that 
does not grant tax sparing credits to developing countries, possibly making 
U.S. multinationals face a much higher effective tax rate in a developing coun- 
try than firms from other countries with a treaty including tax sparing credits. 
3.5  Implications for Financing Policy 
In the face of a high cost of capital for foreign investment financed through 
equity transfers by the parent, the subsidiary may seek alternative sources of 
funds. First, parent transfers can be made in debt instead of equity. Since inter- 
est payments face lower withholding taxes than dividends in many cases, debt 
transfer is often a cheaper way of financing the subsidiary. 
A more important source of debt financing lies in host countries. Local bor- 
rowing, which is ignored by most previous studies on foreign investment, has 
been an important source of funds for foreign investment. At the end of  1989, 
the share of local and other foreign borrowing in total external finance for U.S. 
firms operating abroad was 60.3 percent. The corresponding figure for foreign 
firms operating in the United States was 71.2 percent. 
Column 3 of table 3.3 shows that the cost of capital for foreign investment 
financed by local borrowing is much lower than that for equity financing re- 
gimes. The deduction benefits are proportional to the marginal corporate tax 
Table 3.3  Advantage of Loeal Financing for U.S. Multinationals 
Subsidiary  Tax Cost of  Tax Cost of 
Transfer  Retained  Local  Not Using Subsidiary  Not Using 
of Parent  Earnings with  Debt  Retained Earnings  Local Debt 
Equity  Tax Deferral  Financing  (1 -  2)  (1 -  3) 



















































0.0  5.0 
1.6  9.0 
1.4  6.0 
2.4  6.5 
-1.2  1.7 
0.1  5.0 
0.9  5.1 
0.8  8.0 
1.6  5.2 
1.6  5.1 
2.5  1.9 
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rate in a country, and debt financing is particularly attractive in Japan and 
Germany because of their relatively high corporate tax rates. 
Column 5 indicates that the tax cost of not using debt is much higher for 
foreign investment than for domestic investment. For domestic investment in 
the United States, the tax cost of using equity financing is 5.0 percent. For U.S. 
firms operating in Japan, the cost can be as high as 9.0 percent. 
In addition, the nontax cost of using debt may be lower for foreign invest- 
ment than for domestic investment. A multinational may face less risk of de- 
fault since it can possibly pool relatively independent risks from its worldwide 
operations and use its combined assets as collateral for loans. Further, foreign 
borrowing is an important means to hedge against exchange risks associated 
with foreign-source income. 
When borrowing abroad, a U.S. multinational may have an incentive to con- 
centrate its borrowing where tax benefits are large. Japan, Germany, Italy, and 
Australia are more attractive places for foreign borrowing for U.S. firms than 
Canada, France, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, Sweden, and Switzer- 
land as far as taxes are concerned. This observation has become more relevant 
as integrated world capital markets have  narrowed differences in borrowing 
costs between countries. 
If, for some nontax reasons, a U.S. firm has to finance foreign investment 
using an equity source, subsidiary retained earnings are typically cheaper than 
parent equity transfers, except in Germany, where split corporate tax rates dis- 
criminate against retained earnings (column 4).  Note, however, that the cost of 
capital for investment financed through subsidiary retained earnings reported 
in this study implicitly assumes that home-country taxes on unrepatriated earn- 
ings can b6 deferred. As mentioned earlier, U.S. firms have limited abilities to 
defer some of their home-country tax liabilities. 
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